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Security OpenSSL OpenSSL 1.1.1c Security & Bug Fix Release

Discussion in 'CentOS, Redhat & Oracle Linux News' started by eva2000, May 29, 2019.

  1. eva2000

    eva2000 Administrator Staff Member

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    Nginx 1.17.x
    MariaDB 5.5/10.x
    For Centmin Mod 123.09beta01 users, OpenSSL 1.1.1c has been released. OpenSSL 1.1.1c for Nginx is a security and bug fix release. However, the security bug fix was already backported into Centmin Mod 123.09beta01's OpenSSL 1.1.1b routine 7+ weeks ago Beta Branch - OpenSSL 1.1.1b CVE-2019-1543 security patch in 123.09beta01 :)

    To update your Centmin Mod Nginx's OpenSSL version from 1.1.1b to 1.1.1c, run cmupdate command in SSH first
    Code (Text):
    cmupdate

    this will update your server's Centmin Mod local code in /usr/local/src/centminmod

    example cmupdate output
    Code (Text):
    cmupdate
    No local changes to save
    Updating d5480a2..92373e0
    Fast-forward
     centmin.sh                | 8 ++++----
     example/custom_config.inc | 6 +++---
     2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
    

    Then run centmin.sh menu option 4 to recompile Nginx and check output for command
    Code (Text):
    nginx -V

    and see if Nginx was build with OpenSSL 1.1.1b :)
    Code (Text):
     Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
    
      *) Add build tests for C++.  These are generated files that only do one
        thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each.  This tests that
        the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
    
        This test isn't enabled by default.  It can be enabled with the option
        'enable-buildtest-c++'.
        [Richard Levitte]
    
      *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
        [Patrick Steuer]
    
      *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
        This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
        fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
        generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
        [Kurt Roeckx]
    
      *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
        EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
        util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
        [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
    
      *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
        [Matt Caswell]
    
      *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
        along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
        [Lorinczy Zsigmond]
    
      *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
        [Richard Levitte]
    
      *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
        [Bernd Edlinger]
    
      *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
    
        ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
        for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
        (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
        and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
        bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
        bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
        additional leading bytes are ignored.
    
        It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
        unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
        serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
        the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
        change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
        new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
        messages with a reused nonce.
    
        Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
        integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
        integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
        affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
        is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
        applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
        length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
    
        This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
        Greef of Ronomon.
        (CVE-2019-1543)
        [Matt Caswell]
    
      *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
        [Paul Yang]
    
     
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